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ABSTRACT
Using Ireland as a case study, the overall aim of this paper is to determine if decoupled payments affect
farmers’ behaviour. Using a dynamic, multi product, partial equilibrium model of the EU agricultural
sector, this paper first compares levels of production that would be expected if decoupled payments had no
impact on farmers’ activity with actual observed outcomes. Second this paper compares cereal and cattle
farmers’ profitability prior to decoupling with that observed after the introduction of decoupled payments.
The analysis presented here would suggest that decoupled payments do still maintain a significant effect
on agricultural activity with farmers using this new form of support to partly subsidise unprofitable farm
production.
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1. Introduction
European agricultural policy underwent significant
changes with the Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 2003, where with
some exceptions, member states agreed to implement a
system of single farm payments (SFP) which were
decoupled from production. Decoupled payments were
introduced in order to curb over-production and to
reduce the trade-distorting and inefficiency effects of
the CAP (Falconer and Ward, 2000; Swinbank and
Daugbjerg, 2006). These payments were defined in the
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) as
payments that are financed by taxpayers rather than by
consumers, are not related to current production, factor
use or prices and for which the eligibility criteria are
defined by a fixed historical base period, whereby actual
production is not needed to receive payments. Decoupled
payments are in the World Trade Organisations (WTO)
‘green box’ of agriculture related subsidies and thus must
adhere to the fundamental requirement that the policy
has no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects
(Swinbank and Tranter, 2005). That said, it is often
argued that decoupled payments could still have an
impact on farmers’ behaviour due to factors such as risk
aversion, wealth effects and also the presence of non-
pecuniary benefits associated with farm work (Bhaskar
and Beghin, 2009 and O Donoghue and Whitaker, 2010).
To determine if decoupled payments do in fact affect
farmers behaviour, this paper using a dynamic, multi
product, partial equilibrium model of the EU agricul-
tural sector will first compare projections of agricultural
activity that we would expect to observe if decoupled
payments did not affect farm activity with what was
actually observed since the introduction of full decou-
pling in Ireland in 2005. With the introduction of full
decoupling in Ireland a single farm payment is made to
farmers based on payments they received in a historical
reference period (2000–2002 inclusive). Second, this
paper uses data from a National Farm Survey (NFS)
collected as part of the Farm Accountancy Data
Network of Europe (FADN) to examine the profit-
ability of cattle and cereal farms as these were the
sectors that were most reliant on coupled payments in
Ireland. Specifically we examine the level of production
on cattle and cereal farms that earns a positive market-
based net margin.
In a European context, previous research (such as
Hennessy and Thorne, 2005; Gorton et al., 2006 and
Lobley and Butler, (2010)) examined future farmer
intentions in the light of changes in policy such as the
move towards decoupling. This research highlighted
that farmers planned to make very little change to their
farming activities post decoupling. However, as Tranter
et al. (2007) notes there might be a difference in how
farmers say they will react to a hypothetical change in
policy as opposed to how they act in reality when that
policy measure is in force. This paper should, therefore,
provide a more reliable guide to short term decision
making in the wake of the 2003 CAP reform by
comparing levels of production that would be expected
if decoupled payments had no impact on production
with actual observed behaviour. In terms of overall
structure this paper will in the following section explore
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previous literature relating to the impact of decoupling
of farm support measures on agricultural activity. Next
a description of the modelling framework used in
this analysis is provided. This is followed with a
discussion of the empirical results. Finally this paper
concludes with a discussion of its major findings and
their implications for agricultural policy.
2. Background: The effect of decoupled
payments on production
The European Commission has declared that decoupled
payments fall under the World Trade Organisations
(WTO) category of ‘green box’ subsidies that result in
none, or at most, minimal trade distortions of agricul-
tural markets. Previous research has shown that the new
CAP mechanisms will result in a significant reduction of
gross profit margins in comparison to the previous
support system and an associated risk of activity
cessation (Onate et al., 2007). As production is not
needed to receive subsidies, the recent policy reform
could therefore potentially lead to land abandonment
particularly in marginal rural areas (Osterburg and van
Horn, 2006). However, it has also been reported that the
actual effect is unlikely to be as drastic as farmers
engage in production for non-economic as well as
economic motivations. That is, in contrast to ‘homo-
economicus’ strategies which assume that farmers
behave absolutely rationally and only have profit-
maximisation in mind, there are likely to be a variety
of non-monetary benefits from farming that can
influence their activities (Kantelhardt, 2006; Key and
Roberts, 2009).
Increasingly research, for instance, has demonstrated
that farming may be a vocation that may be valued in
itself (Ackerman, et al., 1989; Herrmann and Uttitz,
1990; Willock et at. 1999a; 1999b). Vanclay (2004)
asserts that farmers seek to make a reasonable income
with each farmer defining what is reasonable for
themselves and that the additional lifestyle factors
associated with farming compensate farmers for those
times when income may be less that what they could
achieve in other endeavours. Key and Roberts (2009)
and Key (2005) describe how attributes associated with
farming such as independence and pride associated with
business ownership are valuable to farmers and these
attributes may not be observable in other types of
employment. Outside of agriculture it has been widely
reported that the self employed, all things being equal,
report much greater levels of satisfaction with their jobs
(Hamilton, 2000). The variety of non-pecuniary benefits
associated with farming mean that farmers may have
an incentive to use decoupled payments as a means
of maintaining a farming lifestyle irrespective of any
financial returns.
A number of other arguments for the supply inducing
effect of decoupled payments have also been advanced.
For example Tielu and Roberts (1998) and Hennessy
(1998) assert that decoupled payments distort produc-
tion by increasing a farm operator’s overall wealth. The
argument here is that with increased income from these
risk free decoupled payments, farmers can more easily
invest in their farm operation as their overall risk
exposure is decreased thus increasing production.
Furthermore, farmers with higher guaranteed incomes
are more likely to be granted access to capital and this
increase in capital availability may also facilitate
agricultural production. One additional reported poten-
tial impact of decoupled payments is that the increase in
wealth may decrease a farmers risk aversion, conse-
quently making farmers more likely to engage in certain
production activities that otherwise they may not have
made. Finally farmers may use decoupled payments to
increase production as a result of expectations that
future payments will be reassessed and based on current
production levels (Coble et al., 2008; O Donoghue and
Whitaker, 2010).
To date, previous research at least from a European
perspective, concerned with determining if decoupled
payments affect farmers’ behaviour has been limited.
This is because the recent reform represents such a new
and radical policy shift that no previous experience
exists with its application and, in addition, its applica-
tion in the EU has been gradual. The work that does
exist in this area has generally examined farmers’
intentions in the light of the introduction of decoupled
payments. Hennessy and Thorne (2005) compared
survey data on farmers production plans post decou-
pling with outputs predicted by a farm-level profit
maximisation model. In this study it was shown that
a significant number of farmers plan to use their
decoupled payments to continue or expand non-viable
production. Similarly in a study of the UK dairy sector,
Colman and Harvey (2004) outline how many farmers
are determined to remain in farming despite low returns.
They report that given the stated commitment of a
majority of dairy producers to continue and even
expand production, it seems likely that they will treat
their direct payments as coupled in order to achieve
their ambitions. Likewise Tranter et al. (2007) in a
survey of farmers in Germany, Portugal and the UK
found that only 30% stated they would alter their mix of
activities in response to decoupling.
Gorton et al. (2008) examined farmers’ attitudes
towards agricultural production and policy support in
the context of the 2003 CAP reform among five Member
States in the EU. They note that while agricultural
policy has shifted from one focused on maximizing
production to more decoupled forms of payment, there
is little evidence that farmers’ attitudes have also
adjusted. The study highlighted how farmers still
overwhelmingly retain a productivist mindset and reject
the idea that they can be competitive without the aid of
policy support. In addition, farmers expressed prefer-
ences for the full utilization of agricultural land for
agricultural production and wished to concentrate on
farming. Similarly, Lobley and Butler (2010) examined
farmers’ intentions following the implementation of the
2003 CAP reforms. The study which was based on a
large sample survey of farmers in the South West of
England found that CAP reform is not stimulating
rapid agricultural restructuring. Lobley and Butler
(2010) notes that while the 2003 CAP reform agreement
may have radically alerted the policy environment
within which farmers operate there is little evidence
that farmers are reacting in an equally radical manner.
This mirrors earlier findings by Walford (2003) and
Burton and Wilson (2006) who found that productivist
tendencies prevail amongst English farmers.
Does the single farm payment affect farmers’ behaviour? A macro and
micro analysis Peter Howley et al.
ISSN 2047-3710 International Journal of Agricultural Management, Volume 2 Issue 1
58 ’ 2012 International Farm Management Association and Institute of Agricultural Management
3. Research Design
Twenty three teams from EU Member States as part of
project called AGMEMOD funded under the European
Commission 6th framework and by contributions from
the partners institutes throughout the EU have built
country level models that reflect the specific situation of
the agricultural sectors in their individual country.
The maintenance of analytical consistency is achieved
via adherence to a common model template across all
the partners involved in the model. In all country
models, agricultural supply and use data as well as
policy data for the years 1973–2005 have been collected.
The CAP budget and national ceilings remain at the
levels set out in Regulation EC 1782/2003. For each
commodity modelled, and in each country, agricultural
production as well as supply, demand, trade, stocks and
domestic prices are derived by econometrically esti-
mated equations.
The national level models have been combined into a
composite EU model. Each country model contains the
behavioural responses of economic agents to changes in
prices, policy instruments and other exogenous vari-
ables. One element of the supply and demand balance
(usually exports), for each commodity modelled, is
derived as a closure variable to ensure that the supply
and use identity holds for all EU markets throughout
the projection period. This condition implies that
production plus beginning stocks plus imports will
always equal domestic use plus ending stocks plus
exports (see figure 1 and figure 2 for a visual illustration
of the structure of the AGMEMOD model).
A commodity country model is linked to the other
countries through a price transmission relationship,
where an EU key-price drives price formation in any
domestic market. The EU key-price is usually set as the
price observed in the most important national market
within the EU for that commodity. In the key price
country, the commodity model includes a price forma-
tion equation. This equation aims at capturing all
exogenous variables affecting price formation within the
EU and, in particular, the world market price, price
policies (intervention prices, for instance), trade agree-
ments, etc. In addition, the lagged EU self-sufficiency
rate is also included as an explanatory variable, thus
making the key-price recursively respond to the previous
year’s outcome. The key-price is then transmitted into
any other domestic market such as Ireland, through a
price transmission (or price linkage) equation that
makes the domestic price a function of the EU key-
price and other possible explanatory variables, e.g., the
own country self sufficiency rate (or net exports) for that
commodity.
Projections of exogenous data relating to macroeco-
nomic series such as exchange rates and GDP taken
from research institutions within each individual
Member State have been incorporated into the model.
In addition, projections of world prices from the Food
and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI)
have been incorporated into the model structure. The
development of specific country models has allowed
for the capture of the inherent heterogeneity of
agricultural systems existing within the EU, while
simultaneously maintaining analytical consistency
across the estimated country models. Within this
Figure 1: Commodity modelling structure
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combined model environment all EU prices, as well as
all elements of agricultural commodity supply and
demand in each member state, are modelled endo-
genously. Hence, the final dynamic, multi-market,
multi-country, composite model developed, allows us
to generate projections for each Member State, under
the assumption of exogenous world prices4.
In order to analyse the impact of policy reform, data
on all of the different types of direct payments that are
and were part of the CAP were collected for each
member state. This was used to create a database which
in a coherent manner across all the member states
incorporated the total budgetary envelopes, the different
types of the EU CAP direct support elements, and their
allocation from the total budgetary envelopes. Using
this policy data a set of country specific variables were
developed which calculated the impact of policy
instruments on the supply and use of various agricul-
tural commodities. In particular, in the case of Ireland
an adjusted gross return figure for grains and a reaction
price for beef were calculated. In other words in the
AGMEMOD modelling approach, all direct payments
are recalculated as a policy price add-on to the relevant
producer price to form a reaction price or expected gross
returns. Thus, when entered into the model structure
these variables will lead to responses by farmers that are
analogous to farmers’ responses to changes in agricul-
tural output prices.
As discussed earlier, there are a variety of reasons
why decoupled payments could still influence agricul-
tural activity. The actual supply inducing effect of
the reaction price for beef and adjusted gross return
for grains can be altered in the model structure by
multiplying them by a multiplier between 0 and 1. The
closer the multiplier is to one then the greater are the
assumed impacts of decoupled payments on production.
For instance, setting the multiplier as equal to 1 assumes
that the reaction price for beef which captures the effect
of policy instruments on the beef sector has the same
impact as output prices. Setting the multiplier as equal
to 0 assumes that the reaction price does not have
any impact on production (i.e. fully decoupled from
production) which would be in keeping with its status as
a green box policy.
Data from the NFS was also examined in order to
ascertain the prevalence of loss-making cereal and cattle
production amongst Irish farmers. The NFS is collected
annually as part of the Farm Accountancy Data
Network requirements of the European Union (Farm
Accountancy Data Network (FADN), 2005). It deter-
mines the financial situation on Irish farms by measur-
ing the level of gross output, costs, income, investment
and indebtedness across the spectrum of farming
systems and sizes and provides data on Irish farm
income to the EU Commission in Brussels and a
database for economic and rural development research
and policy analysis. The sample is weighted to be
representative of farming nationally across Ireland. In
the 2006 NFS survey, 1,159 farmers were surveyed
representing 113,068 farmers nationally.
4. Results
The following analysis aims to provide some guidance
as to the actual impact of decoupled payments by
comparing actual observed market data (CSO, 2009)
with projections from the partial equilibrium (PE)
model under the two different assumptions relating to
Figure 2: AGMEMOD combined model
4 For more details in relation to the structure of this model the reader is referred to Erjavec
et al. (2006; 2011)
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the supply inducing impact of decoupled payments
between 2005 and 2009. As can be seen in Table 1, the
projected levels of grain area harvested for the years
2005–2009 under the zero coupling assumption are
significantly below what was actually observed over this
period. Under the assumption that decoupled payments
maintain the same effect on farm behaviour as output
prices the projections are significantly above that
observed. With the exception of 2006 which was the
first year post decoupling a similar situation is evident in
relation to suckler cow numbers. In the model results,
the extent to which the real figure for suckler cow
numbers and grain area harvested is closer to the
projected figure for full coupling or zero coupling
depends in part on external developments in agricultural
markets. For instance, a larger than expected increase in
cereal prices in 2007 due to, among other things, an
increase in biofuel demand and diminished supplies as a
result of drought from major grain exporters such as
Australia led to a larger than expected market return for
the production of cereals. This resulted in a significant
jump in the area harvested in 2008 to the extent that the
actual area harvested in 2008 was closer to the full
coupling scenario. By 2009 the actual figure for grain
area harvested was much closer to the midpoint of these
two scenarios as cereal prices had fallen back to pre
2007 levels. Therefore while we can see a clear path
emerging whereby production is significantly above
what would be expected if payments were in fact truly
decoupled, suggesting that decoupled payments affect
farm behaviour, it is not possible to precisely quantify
this impact.
To provide a further illustration of the impact of
decoupled payments on farmer’s activity table 2 outlines
the proportion of production in the cattle and cereal
sectors that make a positive market based net margin
post decoupling. The market based net margin is
calculated as market based gross output less direct costs
(such as concentrate feed costs and outside hired labour
(farmers own labour is not included as a cost)) and the
share of overhead costs attributable to the sector under
examination. Market based gross output is simply sales
less purchases plus any coupled premia payments that
were in existence. It does not include decoupled
payments. Focusing on the market based net margin
allows us to examine the profitability of suckler cow and
cereal production.
As shown in Table 2 even after assuming zero labour
costs on the part of the principal farm operator less than
30 percent of suckler cows within the NFS for the five
years examined are raised on farms, which earned a
positive market-based net margin from cattle produc-
tion. In relation to cereal production the proportion
showing a positive market based net margin increased
from 54 percent in 2006 to 88 percent in 2007. The
proportion showing a positive market based net margin
declined substantially in 2008 and 2009 and finally
increased again in 2010. This variability is due to the
considerable variation in cereal prices and the cost of
cereal inputs, most notably the high prices recorded in
2007 and 2010 for cereals compared with the very low
cereal prices of 2009. As we saw in table 1 the number of
suckler cows fell by 7 percent between 2005 and 2009
whereas total cereal production increased by 6 percent
during this period. If farmers treated decoupled
payments as being ‘truly’ decoupled, then given the
negative market farm incomes observed in table 2 it
seems reasonable to expect much larger reductions in
agricultural activity.
Table 2 also reports the proportion of cereal and
suckler cow production that occurs on farms with a
positive family farm income which includes all
decoupled payments in its calculation. It can be seen
that when decoupled payments and the returns to other
farm activities are considered there would be a
significant increase in the proportion of cereal and
cattle production that would be on farms earning a
positive family farm income. More specifically, under
this scenario a total of 87 percent of suckler cow
production in 2008 would be on farms earning a positive
family farm income. A similar situation would be
observable in relation to cereal production as 94 percent
Table 2: Proportion of production with a positive market based net margin 2006–2008
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Suckler cows (%) 29.2 25.6 27.2 20.7 23.5
Suckler cows (% with a positive family farm income –
includes the SFP as a component of farm income)
92 91.6 87 87.3 87.0
Grain area (%) 54.2 88.3 25.5 14.7 70.3
Grain area (% with a positive family farm income –
includes the SFP as a component of farm income)
98.3 99.7 94.2 84.6 97.7
Source: National farm survey
Table 1: Impact of decoupled payments 2005–2009
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 % change
Grain area harvested (1,000 ha)
Zero coupling 258 247 244 244 212
Actual area harvested 276 280 279 314 293 6
Full coupling 308 327 341 351 27
Suckler cows (1,000 head)
Zero coupling 1132 1102 1060 1020 211
Actual numbers 1150 1129 1117 1115 1069 27
Full coupling 1168 1160 1136 1112 23
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of cereal production would be generating a positive
family farm income, with figures of 98.3 and 99.7
percent in 2006 and 2007 respectively.
In table 3 and 4 we categorise cattle farms and cereal
farms by quintile in the year just before the introduction
of decoupling. Here farms are broken into groups
according to their level of adjusted gross margin which
is simply market net margin less all coupled and
decoupled payments and any non production related
fixed costs such as depreciation, maintenance costs and
interest payments etc. First it can be seen that farms
within each quintile group in the cereal sector had on
average positive family farm incomes (market net margin
plus subsidy payments). Interestingly, cattle farmers in the
bottom quintile had on average negative family farm
incomes. We can see, therefore, that even prior to the
introduction of decoupled payments a significant propor-
tion of cattle farmers albeit to a much smaller extent than
presently were using non-farm income to subsidise loss
making agricultural production.
When we calculate market net margin which excludes
subsidy payments such as the special beef premium, only
the top two quintiles in relation to the cereal sector and
the top quintile in relation to the cattle systems make an
average positive market return. This highlights the large
dependency of farmers on subsidy payments to make
profits prior to the introduction of decoupling. As
illustrated in table 2 even though these payments are
since 2005 not linked to production (save for some cross
compliance obligations) farmers still rely on these
supports in order to subsidise what would otherwise
be loss making agricultural activity. Table 3 and 4 also
reports the proportion of farmers with an off-farm job
in each quintile. We can see a trend whereby the farms
in the lowest quintiles have the largest proportion of
farmers with off-farm jobs. For instance, 58 and 72
percent of cattle and cereal farmers respectively in the
bottom quintile have off-farm jobs. These farmers may
not be dependent on farming to make a living and
therefore profit maximising behaviour may be very
different to that which would maximise their utility in
that they may wish to maintain a farming lifestyle
irrespective of any financial rewards.
5. Discussion
Traditionally, direct payments in Europe and elsewhere
have linked payments to production. This has had the
effect of substantially altering the market for particular
agricultural commodities as farmers could receive more
payments simply by producing more of the supported
commodity irrespective of any consumer needs (Ackrill,
2008; Swinbank and Daugbjerg, 2006). In addition to a
large budgetary cost, the policy of price support in the
EU created significant tensions between the EU and
other agricultural exporters. As a result, since the
MacSharry reforms in 1992 the EU has moved from a
policy of price support towards measures that are
decoupled from production. The most significant move
in this regard was the Mid Term Review (MTR) of the
CAP in 2003 where member states agreed to implement
a system of payments which were not related to actual
production. Decoupled payments are in the ‘green box’
of domestic support defined by the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) and thus are assumed to have
none, or at most, minimal trade distorting effects.
Decoupled payments have, however, generated con-
siderable international debate as to whether they do in
fact alter the behaviour of farm operators.
In order to provide some guidance as to the actual
effect of decoupled payments, this paper compared
projections from a PE model under the alternate
assumptions of full and zero coupling with observed
market outcomes between 2005 and 2009. The results
suggest that decoupled payments do still maintain a
positive impact on farmers’ production levels, albeit less
Table 3: Proportion of cattle production with a positive market based net margin 2004 (Euro per hectare)
Adjusted Farm
GM Quintile
Family farm
income
Market Net
Margin
Production
FC
Other FC Adjusted Farm
Market GM
Subsidies Has part
time Job
1 225 2500 100 276 2224 475 0.58
2 158 2269 77 262 27 427 0.56
3 241 2136 64 202 66 377 0.44
4 380 246 70 214 168 425 0.44
5 530 108 80 315 423 423 0.37
Total 253 2174 79 256 82 427 0.48
Source: National Farm Survey
Note: in late September 2012 J1 was approximately equivalent to US$1.29 and GB£0.80
Table 4: Proportion of cereal production with a positive market based net margin 2004 (J per hectare)
Adjusted Farm
GM Quintile
Family farm
income
Market Net
Margin
Production
FC
Other FC Adjusted Farm
Gross Margin
Subsidies Has part
time Job
1 153 2358 167 234 2124 511 0.72
2 220 2200 140 338 138 420 0.37
3 248 2202 113 510 308 450 0.41
4 554 97 99 328 425 457 0.47
5 631 148 126 662 810 483 0.31
Total 358 2108 130 403 295 466 0.47
Source: National Farm Survey
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than what would be expected if payments were still fully
coupled to production. This viewpoint was supported by
the analysis of a National Farm Survey which showed
that a large proportion of cattle and cereal farms are
operating at a market loss and appear to be using
decoupled payments to subsidise unprofitable production.
Traditional economic theory suggests that individuals
make decisions based on the expected change in their
level of ‘well-being’, where the technical term used for
well-being or welfare is utility (Edwards-Jones, 2006).
Given that utility is a difficult concept to measure
economists have often made the simplifying assumption
that money can act as a substitute for utility. This has
lead to the situation observed in many agricultural
economic models where it is assumed that all farmers
are rational profit maximisers (Edwards-Jones, 2006).
This approach may not account adequately for the
farming behaviour of individuals as it fails to recognise
the large and increasing literature which suggests
farmers’ behaviours result from complex processes
influenced by a range of socio-economic and psycholo-
gical variables (see Willock et al., 1999a; 1999b and
Howley and Dillon, 2012 for a review of this literature).
It could be that farmers are perhaps not just driven by
financial goals but are also influenced by goals in
relation to the satisfaction associated with farming. In
other words, as a result of non-pecuniary benefits
associated with farm relative to non-farm work, many
farm operators may be using decoupled payments to
subsidise what would otherwise be unprofitable farm
production in order to maintain a farming lifestyle.
Farmers may fear a possible diminution in the lifestyle
and social benefits associated with traditional farm
work if they make significant reductions on their level of
farm activity.
There have also been a number of other reported
potential influences of decoupled payments on farm
activity. This includes issues such as risk aversion,
wealth effects and increase in accessibility to loans from
lenders that could also result in decoupled payments
having a positive impact on farm activity (see Bhaskar
and Beghin, 2009 and O Donoghue and Whitaker, 2010
for a review of this literature). Furthermore, through
cross compliance obligations, farmers are required to
maintain their land in good agricultural and environ-
mental condition in order to receive their full payment.
This is likely to result in some compliance costs and may
make it optimal for certain farmers to keep land in
agricultural use where without this requirement it
would otherwise be left idle or converted to non-
agricultural use.
6. Conclusion
The results presented in this paper would suggest that
cereal and cattle farmers in Ireland do not treat the new
single farm payment as being ‘truly’ decoupled from
production. Decoupled payments appears to still elicit a
behavioural response from farmers in that it encourages
production at levels above that which would be optimal
from a market perspective. In effect many farmers are
using decoupled payments to at least partly subsidise
what would otherwise be unprofitable farm activity. It
could be that for many farmers maximising income may
not be the most important objective with benefits such
as social interaction with other farmers or simply the
enjoyment of farming also important considerations.
Also, the single farm payment despite being decoupled
from production might still affect farmers’ behaviour
via wealth or risk reducing incentives. It is also
important to note that the presence of a large amount
of sunk costs that exist regardless of production levels
can mean that it may be optimal for some marginally
unproductive farmers to maintain production (O
Donoghue and Howley, 2012)
While decoupled payments still appear to influence
agricultural production, this impact is less than what
would be expected if these payments were still coupled
to production. From this perspective, the move towards
decoupled payments is a step in the direction of a less
trade distorting policy. Moreover decoupling is both a
new and radical shift in the CAP and it is conceivable
that farmers may get closer to treating these payments
as truly decoupled in time. For example, it may take
some time before the breeding stock of cows can be
adjusted. Additionally, multiple generations of farmers
have adapted and become used to payments being
coupled to production and therefore it may take time
for farmers to realise that they are both losing money
and that actual production is not needed to receive
payments. In relation to future work, further micro-
econometric and behavioural analysis will be needed at
the farm level to ascertain the differential impact of
decoupled payments. In addition, a better understand-
ing of the motivational profiles of farmers could aid
efforts to understand and predict farmers’ response to
policy changes as it seems likely that farmers will
consider a wide variety of factors in addition to financial
considerations in determining their levels of farm
production.
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